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Abstract. This paper proposes a security framework for secure data communi-
cations across the partners in the Semiconductor Supply Chain Environment. 
The security mechanisms of the proposed framework will be based on the 
SSL/TLS and OAuth 2.0 protocols, which are two standard security protocols. 
However, both protocols are vulnerable to a number of attacks, and thus more 
sophisticated security mechanisms based on these protocols should be designed 
and implemented in order to address the specific security challenges of the 
Semiconductor Supply Chain in a more effective and efficient manner. 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, data communication across the partners in the Semiconductor Supply 
Chain can be the target of many known and unknown security threats exploiting many 
security breaches in the internal/external environment of the partners due to its heter-
ogeneous and dynamic nature as well as the fact that non-professional users in securi-
ty issues usually operate their information systems. Particularly, these vulnerabilities 
in the Semiconductor Supply Chain Environment can be exploited by attackers with a 
wide spectrum of motivations ranging from criminal intents aimed at financial gain to 
industrial espionage and cyber-sabotage. Attackers can compromise the data commu-
nication between legitimate parties in the Semiconductor Supply Chain and thus can 
jeopardize the delivery of services across the partners as well as the continuity of the 
service provision. As a result, Semiconductor Supply Chain partners will suffer from 
damaging repercussions, which can cause significant revenue loss, destroy their brand 
and eventually hinder their advancement. Consequently, a security framework for 
secure data communications across the partners in the Semiconductor Supply Chain 
Environment is of utmost importance.   
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Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to provide a security framework for 
secure data communications across the partners in the Semiconductor Supply Chain. 
Towards this direction, in this paper, we firstly consider representative examples of 
various attacks that have been seen in the wild and can cause potential security issues 
and challenges in the Semiconductor Supply Chain Environment. The range of the 
attacks shows how vital is a security framework for secure data communications for 
the partners in the Supply Chain of the Semiconductor Industry. Moreover, we pro-
vide a categorization of the various attack examples based on the intrusion method 
that they use to compromise the target and gain a persistent foothold in the target’s 
environment. Furthermore, we propose a security framework for secure data commu-
nication across the partners in the Supply Chain. The security mechanisms of the 
proposed framework will be based on the SSL/TLS and OAuth 2.0 protocols, which 
are two standard security protocols. The SSL/TLS protocol is the de facto standard for 
secure Internet communications [1]. On the other hand, the OAuth 2.0 protocol is the 
industry-standard protocol for authorization [2]. However, both the SSL/TLS protocol 
and the OAuth 2.0 protocol are vulnerable to a number of attacks, and thus more so-
phisticated security mechanisms based on these protocols should be designed and 
implemented in order to address the specific security challenges of the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain in a more effective and efficient manner.  
2 Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges in the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain Environment 
In this section, we consider representative examples of various attacks in industrial 
and enterprise domains that have been seen in the wild and can cause potential securi-
ty issues and challenges in the Semiconductor Supply Chain Environment. We cate-
gorize these attack examples into 5 main categories based on the intrusion method 
that they use to compromise the target and gain a persistent foothold in the target’s 
environment. The 5 main categories that we identified are the following: a) spear 
phishing attacks, b) watering hole attacks, c) attacks based on “trojanized” third-party 
software, d) attacks based on malicious code and counterfeit certificates, and e) at-
tacks based on tampered devices. 
2.1 Spear Phishing Attacks 
Phishing is a kind of social-engineering attack where adversaries use spoofed emails 
to trick people into sharing sensitive information or installing malware on their com-
puters. Indeed, victims perceive these spoofed emails as being associated with a trust-
ed brand. In other words, phishing attacks target the people using the systems instead 
of targeting directly the systems that people use. Thus, phishing attacks are able to 
circumvent the majority of an organization’s or individual’s security measures. More-
over, it is worthwhile to mention that phishing has spread beyond email to include 
VOIP, SMS, instant messaging, social networking sites, and even massively multi-
player games. Moreover, cyber-criminals have shifted from sending mass-emails, 
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hoping to trick anyone, to more sophisticated but also more selective “spear-phishing” 
attacks that use relevant contextual information to trick specific groups of people. In 
principle, “spear-phishing” attacks are more dangerous than typical phishing attacks 
[3]. Here are a few examples of “spear-phishing” attacks from the wild. 
Icefog. In 2011, Kaspersky Lab started to investigate a threat actor called ‘Icefog’ that 
attacked many different groups, such as government institutions, military contractors, 
telecom operators, satellite operators, among others, through their supply chain. This 
campaign targeted organizations mostly in South Korea and Japan, but it was suspect-
ed that it also targeted the United States and Europe [4]. The intrusion method of this 
attack was phishing e-mails with a malicious attachment or a link to an infected web 
page. The attacker could compromise the victim’s machine either by tricking the vic-
tim to install the attached malware or by tricking the victim to visit the malicious web 
page [5]. Afterwards, the attacker could steal files from the victim’s machine, run 
commands to locate and steal specific information from the victim’s machine, and 
also communicate with local database servers in order to steal information from them. 
In addition, Icefog was capable of uploading special tools to extend the capabilities of 
the installed malware, such as tools for stealing cached browser passwords in the 
infected machine. In 2012, a Mac OS version of Icefog (Macfog) was created [4], but 
Kaspersky suspected that it was a beta-testing phase to be used in targeted victims 
later. Finally, it is worth mentioning the “hit and run” nature of Icefog, since the 
Icefog attackers appeared to know very well what they need from the victims and 
thus, once the information was obtained, the victim was abandoned. 
Target. At the end of 2013, Target suffered a cyber-attack that exposed approximate-
ly 40 million debit and credit card accounts [6] and 70 million e-mail addresses, 
phone numbers and other personal information. The hackers started their attack by 
sending phishing e-mails, including malware, to employees of a third-party vendor, 
but it was not known if only one vendor was targeted. In addition, it was suspected 
that the malware in question was Citadel, a password-stealing bot that was a deriva-
tive of the ZeuS banking trojan and allowed the attackers to access Target’s network 
by using stolen credentials. It was estimated that the phishing campaign had started at 
least two months before the main attack carried out. Brian Krebs was the first to break 
the news about this attack on his security blog followed by Target’s Statement, re-
leased a day after. 
Home Depot. In April 2014, just four months after the Target attack, Home Depot 
was the victim of a data breach. However, they only started investigations on 2nd 
September, 2014 and released a statement on 8th September, 2014 [7]. It was found 
that the attackers, similar to the attackers of Target attack, used third party vendor’s 
credentials to access Home Depot’s network. After being inside the retailer’s network, 
the attackers exploited a known vulnerability in Windows XP called “zero-days” in 
order to escape detection [7]. Finally, this attack resulted in the theft of 53 million e-
mail addresses and 56 million credit card accounts. 
German Steel Mill. In late 2014 (no specific date was provided), Germany’s Federal 
Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report communicating that a German 
steel mill had been attacked. The attackers’ point of entry was the plant’s business 
network and the infiltration was made possible with a spear phishing attack [8]. The 
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phishing emails could have had a malicious attachment or a link to a website from 
where malware could be downloaded. Once the malware was installed, the attackers 
were able to take control of the production software. SANS Institute provided the 
BSI’s report, translated to English, where it is mentioned that the attack resulted in an 
incident where the furnace could not be shut down properly, and as a result, it led to a 
“massive damage” to the German steel mill. 
Dragonfly - 1st tactic. A cyber-espionage group, known as Dragonfly or Energetic 
Bear, began a campaign in late 2010 [9] with the intention of targeting the energy 
sector and industrial control systems (ICS) through their Supply Chain. In other 
words, the Dragonfly group attacked the suppliers of the target instead of attacking 
the target directly. 
The Dragonfly group applied at least three different infection tactics against vic-
tims in the energy sector. The first one was an email spear-phishing campaign and is 
examined in this section. However, the Dragonfly group used two main pieces of 
malware in its attacks. Both are Remote Access Tool (RAT) type malware enabling 
the attackers to access and control the compromised computers.  
The favoured malware tool of the Dragonfly group was Backdoor.Oldrea, which 
was also known as Havex or the Energetic Bear RAT. Symantec reported that Oldrea 
was used in around 95% of infections. This malware acted as a back door for the at-
tackers onto the victim’s computer, enabling them to extract information and install 
further malware. In particular, Oldrea, gathered system information such as operating 
system, computer and user name, country, language, Internet adapter configuration 
information, available drives, default browser, running processes, desktop file list, My 
Documents, Internet history, program files, and root of available drives. In addition, 
Oldrea collected data from Outlook (address book) and ICS related software configu-
ration files [10]. All this data was collected and written to a temporary file in an en-
crypted form before it was POSTed to the remote C&C (command-and-control) serv-
er controlled by the Dragonfly attackers. Moreover, the second main malware tool 
used by the Dragonfly group was Trojan.Karagany. It was a back door programmed in 
C/C++ and used mainly for reconnaissance operations. Specifically, it was designed 
to download and install additional files and exfiltrate data. Moreover, it had plugin 
capability and its payload was approximately 72 KBs in size. Finally, Tro-
jan.Karagany contained a small embedded DLL file, which monitored WSASend and 
send APIs for capturing “Basic Authentication” credentials [10]. 
According to the first approach (i.e., email spear-phishing campaign), selected ex-
ecutives and senior employees in target companies received emails with a malicious 
PDF attachment. Symantec states that the infected emails had two possible subject 
lines: “The account” and “Settlement of delivery problem”. In addition, all the emails 
were from a single Gmail address. The email spear-phishing campaign was conducted 
from February 2013 to June 2013 [10]. 
2.2 Watering Hole Attacks  
To attack an organization, cyber criminals “trojanize” a legitimate website often visit-
ed by the target company’s employees. RSA Advanced Threat Intelligence Team 
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correlated this behaviour with the one of a lion waiting for its prey at a watering hole, 
hence the name. RSA was the first to use the term “watering hole”, in late July 2012 
[11]. Here are a few examples of watering hole attacks from the wild.  
VOHO. According to [11], “VOHO” campaign targeted Financial Services or Tech-
nology Services in Massachusetts and Washington, DC. This campaign worked by 
inserting JavaScript element in the legitimate website that would redirect the victim 
(i.e., website visitor) unknowingly to an exploit website. Then, the exploit website 
would check if the user was running a Windows machine and Internet Explorer 
browser, and then it would install a version of “gh0st RAT”. “gh0st RAT” was a Re-
mote Access Trojan that allowed attackers to control the infected endpoints, log key-
strokes, provide live feeds of webcam and microphone as well as download and up-
load files. 
Dragonfly - 2nd tactic. As described before in “Dragonfly - 1st tactic” section, the 
Dragonfly group has used at least three infection tactics against targets in the energy 
sector. After the earliest tactic (i.e., email spear-phishing campaign) that was de-
scribed in “Dragonfly - 1st tactic” section, the Dragonfly attackers shifted their focus 
to watering hole attacks. It was noticed that this shift happened in June 2013 [10]. The 
Dragonfly attackers compromised a number of energy-related websites and injected 
an iframe into each of them. Then, this iframe would redirect users to another legiti-
mate, but also compromised, website hosting the Lightsout exploit kit, as shown in 
Fig. 1. This in turn would exploit either Java or Internet Explorer to download Oldrea 
or Karagny on the target’s machine. Besides, in September 2013, the Dragonfly group 
started using a new version of this exploit kit, known as the Hello exploit kit. The 
main web page for this kit contained JavaScript that was able to identify installed 
browser plugins. Then, the victim was redirected to a URL which in turn determined 
the best exploit to use according to the collected information [10]. 
Shylock. In November 2013, BAE Systems Applied Intelligence announced that a 
series of legitimate websites had been infected with the Shylock malware [12]. The 
cyber-criminals infected a legitimate website by inserting a JavaScript file that initial-
ly identified when the browser was used and then this JavaScript file was responsible 
to show a message, in the browser’s style, prompting the user to download the mal-
ware that, however, was presented as innocent software. BAE Systems gave the fol-
lowing message example: “Additional plugins are required to display all the media on 
this page”, with a button saying “Install Missing Plugins…”. In case that the user 
decided to proceed and install the “missing plugins”, the Shylock malware was in-
stalled on his/her machine.  
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Fig. 1. Watering Hole Attack. 
2.3 Attacks based on “trojanized” third-party software  
This section includes a real-life example of attacks based on “trojanized” software of 
ICS equipment providers.  
Dragonfly - 3rd tactic. The third tactic of the Dragonfly group was the infection of a 
number of legitimate software packages. Particularly, three different ICS equipment 
providers were targeted and the Dragonfly attackers inserted malware into the soft-
ware bundles that these providers had made available online for download from their 
websites [10]. The first provider discovered that it was compromised shortly after 
infection, but the malware had already been downloaded 250 times. The second pro-
vider had infected software available for download for at least 6 weeks and the third 
provider had infected software available online for 10 days, approximately. 
2.4 Attacks based on Malicious Code and Counterfeit Certificates 
This section includes two examples of attacks based on malicious code and counter-
feit certificates in industrial environment. 
Stuxnet. The German Steel Mill attack described earlier is not the first attack that 
caused physical damage of equipment. The first one was the Stuxnet attack [13] that 
was designed to target SCADA systems and was responsible for attacking an Iranian 
nuclear facility. Stuxnet exploited four zero-days vulnerabilities, compromised two 
digital certificates, injected code into ICS and hid the code from the operator [14]. 
After implementing the code (process that probably took a long time), the attackers 
had to steal digital certificates, in order to avoid detection [14]. Stuxnet compromised 
the system via USB and infected every Windows PC it could find. However, in terms 
of controllers, it was much pickier. It targeted only controllers from one specific man-
ufacturer (Siemens).  
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Meltdown and Spectre. In the early 2018, researchers revealed that almost every 
computer chip manufactured in the last 20 years contains fundamental security flaws, 
with specific variations on those flaws being named Meltdown [15] and Spectre [16]. 
The flaws arise from features which are built into chips and enable them to run faster. 
These vulnerabilities allow attackers to use malicious programs to get access to data 
previously completely protected. It is accomplished by exploiting two important tech-
niques used to speed up computer chips, called speculative execution and caching.  
 
2.5 Attacks based on Tampered Devices 
This section includes a real-life example of attacks based on tampered devices in 
business environment. 
Michaels Stores Attack. In May 2011, Michaels Stores reported an attack that al-
lowed criminals to steal credit and debit cards and the associated PIN codes. To steal 
this information, attackers tampered at least 70 point of sale (POS) terminals [17]. In 
a blog entry from Krebs on Security, Krebs explained that there are few ways to tam-
per with POS terminals. One way is to have pre-compromised terminals ready to be 
installed at the cash register. In addition, fake POS terminals can also be used to rec-
ord data from swipe cards and PIN entry. For precaution, Michaels Stores replaced 
7,200 PIN pads and trained employees to check regularly if the equipment had been 
compromised. 
 
3 Security Framework for the Semiconductor Supply Chain 
Environment  
3.1 Definition of the Security Framework 
The security framework for the Semiconductor Supply Chain environment should 
provide appropriate security mechanisms to address the specific security challenges of 
the Semiconductor Supply Chain in a more effective and efficient manner. As it is 
shown in Fig. 2, the security mechanisms of the proposed framework will be based on 
the SSL/TLS and OAuth 2.0 protocols, which are two standard security protocols. 
The SSL/TLS protocol is the de facto standard for secure Internet communications 
and the OAuth 2.0 protocol is the industry-standard protocol for authorization. How-
ever, both the SSL/TLS protocol and the OAuth 2.0 protocol are vulnerable to a num-
ber of attacks, and thus more sophisticated security mechanisms based on these proto-
cols should be designed and implemented in order to address the specific security 
challenges of the Semiconductor Supply Chain in a more effective and efficient man-
ner. Specifically, as it is shown in Fig. 2, the proposed framework is focused on secu-
rity mechanisms for the following two types of communication in the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain Environment: (i) Client-to-Server communication, and (ii) Server-to-
Server communication. Thus, the security framework should include appropriate se-
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curity mechanisms ensuring secure data communication between the partners’ clients 
and partners’ servers, and appropriate security mechanisms ensuring secure data 
communication between the servers of the Semiconductor Supply Chain partners. The 
security mechanisms for the Client-to-Server communication will be based on the 
SSL/TLS and OAuth 2.0 protocols, and the security mechanisms for the Server-to-
Server communication will be based only on SSL/TLS protocol. 
 
Fig. 2. Security Framework. 
3.2 Dedicated Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Semiconductor Supply 
Chain Environment 
In this section, we provide the description of the dedicated Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) that is an essential component of the Security Framework of the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain Environment. The dedicated PKI is responsible for issuing and manag-
ing all the required digital certificates that will be used by the security mechanisms. 
Public Key Infrastructure. In principle, a public key infrastructure (PKI) is based on 
digital certificates. Digital certificates are sometimes also referred to as X.509 certifi-
cates or simply as certificates. PKI is defined by RFC 2822 (Internet Security Glossa-
ry) as a set of software, hardware, encryption technologies, people and procedures 
that allow a trusted third party to establish the integrity and ownership of a public key. 
Furthermore, the trusted third party, called Certification Authority (CA), typically 
issues the certificates. The CA signs the certificate by using its private key. Moreover, 
it generates the corresponding public key to all eligible participating parties. 
Dedicated PKI Trust Model. The dedicated PKI trust model for the Semiconductor 
Supply Chain Environment follows the traditional hierarchical PKI trust model which 
is based on the establishment of superior-subordinate CA relationships (See Fig 3). It 
can be represented as a tree with the root at the top and the branches extending to-
wards the bottom. The elements of the inverted tree are nodes and leaves. The nodes 
represent the CAs and the leaves represent the end entities. The root (i.e., CA) is the 
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node located at the top of the inverted tree and below the root CA there are zero or 
more layers of subordinate CAs. The root CA is the starting point for trust and issues 
a self-signed certificate as well as certificates to subordinate CAs that are immediately 
below it but not to the end entities. Subordinate CAs, in turn, issue certificates to the 
next lower level subordinate CAs or end entities, respectively. 
 
Fig 3. Dedicated PKI Trust Model. 
 
According to the dedicated PKI trust model, each of the retailers, distributors, front-
end components, back-end components, inventories, and suppliers hosts its own CA 
that issues the certificates of its registered end-users (i.e., servers). In addition, there is 
a CA (i.e., Retailer CA) that issues the CA certificates of all the CAs which are set up 
into the retailers of the specific Semiconductor Supply Chain environment. Moreover, 
there is a CA (i.e., Distributor CA) that issues the CA certificates of all the CAs which 
are set up into the distributors' premises. Furthermore, there is a CA (Manufacturing 
(Mfr) CA) that issues the CA certificates of the CAs which are set up into the front-
end component’s premises, back-end component’s premises and inventory. Similarly, 
there is a CA (i.e., Supplier CA) that issues the CA certificates of all the CAs which 
are set up into the suppliers’ premises. Finally, there is a CA (i.e., Root CA) that is-
sues the CA certificates of the Retailer CA, Distributor CA, Manufacturing (Mfr) CA, 
and Supplier CA. It is supposed that the Root CA, Retailer CA, Distributor CA, Man-
ufacturing (Mfr) CA, and Supplier CA are controlled by the main entity (e.g., In-
fineon) of the specific Semiconductor Supply Chain environment in order to avoid 
trust concerns associated with subordination between the participating entities belong-
ing to different domains. 
4 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we provided a number of representative examples of various attacks that 
have been witnessed in the wild and can cause potential security issues and challenges 
in the Semiconductor Supply Chain Environment. Furthermore, Moreover, we pro-
vided a categorization of the various attack examples based on the intrusion method 
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that they use to compromise the target and gain a persistent foothold in the target’s 
environment. Furthermore, we proposed a security framework for secure data com-
munication across the partners in the supply chain. The security mechanisms of the 
proposed framework will be based on the SSL/TLS and OAuth 2.0 protocols, which 
are two standard security protocols. However, both protocols are vulnerable to a 
number of attacks. Thus, as future work, we plan to design and implement more so-
phisticated TLS – based mechanisms and OAuth 2.0 – based mechanisms for the 
proposed security framework in order to address the specific security challenges of 
the Semiconductor Supply Chain in a more effective and efficient manner. 
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